Book Review of Toxic Debts and the Superfund Dilemma by Rosenberg, Ronald H
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1996
Book Review of Toxic Debts and the Superfund
Dilemma
Ronald H. Rosenberg
William & Mary Law School, rhrose@wm.edu
Copyright c 1996 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Rosenberg, Ronald H., "Book Review of Toxic Debts and the Superfund Dilemma" (1996). Faculty Publications. Paper 1657.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1657
104 Environmental History 
Toxic Debts and the Superfund Dilemma. By Harold C. Barnett. Chapel Hill : Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press, 1994. xiv + 334 p'p . Illustrations, bibliographical references, 
index. C loth $49.95, paper $19.95. 
When the environmental history oflate-twentieth-century America is written, the enact-
ment and implementation of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act (CERCLA) is unlikely to be viewed as a crowning achievement. 
The act, commonly known as the "Superfund," is the fo cus of Toxic Debts and the 
Superfund Dilemma, by Harold C. Barnett, an economics professor at the University of 
Rhode Island. Barnett concludes that the Superfund, which went in to effect in 1980, has 
failed to promote an efficient and equitable response to environmental and public health 
threats posed by hazardous waste sites. This failure, he states, stems from inherent con-
fli cts over economic and environmental priorities that never have been adequately re-
solved. 
Barnett first examines the underlying production of hazardous wastes, then discusses 
the political evolution of the CERCLA law and analyzes its implementation . He con-
cludes the book by identifying the law's shortcomings and recommending its redesign. 
Barnett argues that CERCLA's failure is attributable to four essential characteristics of 
the program: . 
• The failure to resolve the conflict over "How clean is clean?" resulted in costly and 
impermanent remedies. Barnett blames this on Congress, for failing to set forth cleanup 
objectives as the starting point of remedy selection and making cost.a secondary factor, 
and on the Environmental Protection Agency, which sacrificed cleanup effectiveness 
to cost considerations. 
• The inability to resolve conflicts over an equitable distribution of the cleanup expenses 
also compromised the program's efficiency. Under the Superfund scheme, the EPA · 
bears the responsibility for distributing cleanup costs - but it could not (or would not) 
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impose major remediation expenses on major industries. This seems to be as much a 
problem of political will as of contradictory policy goals. 
I- Barnett found that EPA staff resources were insufficient to carry out a broad remediation mandate-a common enough problem, in that aggressive, publicly-supported regula-
I tory policy often is frustrated by inadequate funding for implementation. 
I _ Barnett also notes that the Superfund program has come to depend on state govern-
ments, for-profit contractors, and other entities whose interests do not necessarily co-
incide with those of Congress. 
For Barnett, the "Superfund dilemma" is a question of "whether it is 'preferable to err 
on the side of higher than necessary cost and potentially negative economic impacts [for 
waste cleanups] or on the side of higher risk and potentially negative public health and 
environmental impacts" [po 282]. 
Toxic Debts and the Superfund Dilemma reaches disturbing conclusions about the 
ability of the U.S. government to fashion an effective and equitable environmental policy 
in the face of substantial corporate opposition. 
Reviewed by Ronald H. Rosenberg. Mr:-Rosenberg teaches in the Marshall-Wythe School 
of Law at the College of William cmd Mary. 
